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NOTE
RECLASSIFYING BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS:
WHO CARES WHAT CONGRESS WANTS ANYWAY?
Jeremy D. Lemon†
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet is the single greatest communication invention of our time.1
It allows instantaneous communication through a broad array of networks
all over the world, providing an immense amount of information at the
users’ fingertips. After the first commercial web browser became available
to the consumer market in 1993, the Internet, in a few short years,
revolutionized modern day communication.2 It drastically changed
mankind’s methods of communication so much that it makes one shudder
to imagine a world without the Internet. Our dependence on the Internet is
ever-increasing as the commercial, educational, and social benefits received
from the Internet are recognized.3 Companies rely on Internet websites to
sell their products, and many teachers now post homework assignments
online for their students.4 In fact, students regularly consult Internet
websites to access information necessary for school projects, papers, and
assignments, as well as for entertainment purposes. Socially, many websites
such as Facebook, Myspace, and Twitter allow users to post a personal
profile to establish and maintain consistent contact with other users all
across the world. Instant messaging capabilities allow users to
instantaneously communicate by typing messages to another user.5 Also,
instant communication software—such as Skype—allows users to video
chat through the Internet, and websites such as YouTube allow users to post
† Articles and Book Reviews Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW; J.D. Candidate
(2012), Liberty University School of Law; B.S. Government: Politics and Policy (2009),
Liberty University. I would like to thank my parents, Rob and Anita Lemon, for their
constant support and Judge Paul Spinden for his guidance. Additionally, I would like to
thank the Law Review, Volume 5 members as well as the current members, for all the time
and effort spent in editing this Note and providing valuable suggestions.
1. Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 4 (FCC, Working Paper
No. 31, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See BLACKBOARD, http://www.blackboard.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
5. See AOL, http://www.aim.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
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videos to provide entertainment and education.6 In short, the Internet has
made available a vast new world of endless information through
instantaneous communication.
The success and innovation of the Internet are often attributed to the
“market forces, investment, and competition that have driven its growth.”7
These three components are made possible by the openness that has defined
the Internet throughout its development.8 Congress and the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) preserved the Internet’s openness
through their policy of generally not regulating Internet access.9 Even the
FCC’s chairman recognized that this was “‘the best decision [the]
government ever made with respect to the Internet.’”10 This policy of
Internet openness has led to great innovation and relatively inexpensive
access to the Internet.11
Despite the benefits and success of non-regulatory policies, the FCC
recently proposed a new regulatory scheme for the Internet after having its
jurisdiction challenged in court.12 In April 2010, in Comcast Corp. v. FCC,
the D.C. Court of Appeals confused the FCC as to the FCC’s jurisdictional
reach delegated by Congress.13 In the aftermath of this case, the FCC
proposed subjecting broadband Internet access to mandatory and broad
regulation by reclassifying Internet access from an information service to a
telecommunications service.14

6. See SKYPE, http://www.skype.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011); YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
7. Oxman, supra note 1, at 5.
8. Id.
9. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006); In re
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (2005) [hereinafter Policy Statement].
10. Comments of AT&T, Inc. to FCC, ATT.COM 1 (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/public_policy/AT&TNet_Neutrality_Comments1_
14_09.pdf.
11. Oxman, supra note 1, at 5.
12. In re Framework for Broadband Internet Service, 75 Fed. Reg. 36071-01 para. 1-2
(June 24, 2010) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry].
13. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the FCC
“failed to tie its assertion of ancillary authority over Comcast’s Internet service to any
‘statutorily mandated responsibility’”).
14. See discussion infra Part II.
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In the Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”)15 and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“Telecommuniations Act”),16 Congress
delegated to the FCC the regulatory framework to impose regulations on
different types of communications.17 This regulatory framework is quite
extensive and far-reaching and to this point has only been minimally
applied to the Internet. This Note proposes that subjecting broadband
Internet access18 to further regulations under Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934 violates the FCC’s jurisdictional reach
prescribed by Congress.19 Section II reviews the Communications Act of
1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and provides a
thorough discussion of the regulatory framework mandated by Congress, as
well as the historical underpinnings of the framework. Section III addresses
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, the controlling case that created uncertainty
regarding the FCC’s jurisdiction over the Internet. Section III also explains
the measures proposed by the FCC to resolve the jurisdictional issue and
the Administrative Procedure Act’s process for holding agency actions
adverse to Congress’s delegated authority. Section IV argues that subjecting
broadband Internet access providers or any component of a provider’s
service to regulation under Title II of the Communications Act violates the
text and congressional intent of the Act as amended.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Current Classification Framework of Communications
Through the Communications Act of 1934, Congress established the
FCC “for the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio” to make “Nation-wide, and world-wide

15. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
16. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
17. See generally 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614.
18. Broadband Internet access refers “to the bundle of services that facilities-based
providers sell to end users in the retail market. This bundle allows end users to connect to
the Internet, and often includes other services such as e-mail and online storage.” Notice of
Inquiry, supra note 12, at 1 n.1.
19. This Note does not address every facet of the Internet and all its capabilities. Instead,
this Note addresses whether the FCC may regulate broadband Internet access. The term
“Internet service providers” (ISPs) may be used interchangeably with “broadband Internet
access providers.”
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wire and radio communication service” 20 available to everyone in the
United States. When the Communications Act took force, the only
communications that the FCC was empowered to regulate were
telecommunications and radio broadcasts.21
As technology progressed, updates to this area of the law became
necessary.22 Congress supplemented the Communications Act by
implementing the Telecommunications Act, which was enacted “for the
express purposes of promoting competition, reducing regulation, and
encouraging the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies.”23 In the Telecommunications Act, Congress expressed its
policy concerning the Internet as a desire “to promote the continued
development of the Internet”24 and “to preserve the vibrant and competitive
free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or
State regulation.”25 In 2005, the FCC declared its own policy regarding the
Internet as the desire to offer “guidance and insight into [the FCC’s]
approach to the Internet and broadband that is consistent with these
Congressional [sic] directives.”26 In this official Policy Statement, the FCC
adopted certain principles “[t]o encourage broadband deployment and
preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public
Internet . . . .”27
In the Telecommunications Act, Congress provided for two separate
categories of regulation: “telecommunications carriers and information
service
providers.”28
This
distinction
is
crucial
because
“telecommunications carriers” are subject to broad regulation as common
carriers under Title II of the Act,29 but “information service providers” are

20. 47 U.S.C. § 151.
21. See MAX D. PAGLIN, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
3-5 (1989).
22. SHARON K. BLACK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE 1-9 (2002).
23. In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853, 14,856 n.8 (2005) (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.)) [hereinafter Report and Order].
24. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
26. Policy Statement, supra note 9, at 14,987 para. 3.
27. Id.
28. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975 (2005).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 153(44).
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not common carriers and are regulated with only a light touch under Title
I.30
1. Telecommunications Carriers
A telecommunications carrier is “any provider of telecommunications
services,”31 which is defined as “the offering of telecommunications for a fee
directly to the public.”32 Telecommunications itself is the “transmission,
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s
choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent
and received.”33 Under the Telecommunications Act, telecommunications
carriers are classified as common carriers,34 which are subject to broad
regulation under Title II of the Telecommunications Act.35
Telecommunications historically encompassed telephone, telegraph, and
cable services.36 Under Title II, common carriers must charge just and
reasonable rates, have nondiscriminatory policies, defer to hearings
concerning alleged lawlessness, and file certain contracts with the FCC.37
Such regulations are mandatory, but the FCC must forbear from regulating
if “the public interest requires it.”38

30. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976.
31. 47 U.S.C. § 153(44).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 153(46).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). For this definition, think of a telephone. The telephone
transports a message to a specific point of the caller’s choosing, while the content and form
of the message do not change. For example, the caller speaks into the telephone, and the
receiver is able to hear the speaker’s communication because the form and content of the
communication are the same as when sent by the speaker.
34. 47 U.S.C. § 153(10). This section defines a “common carrier” or “carrier” as
any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission
of energy, except where reference is made to common carriers not subject to
this chapter; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as
such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.
Id.
35. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976; see also Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3, 47 U.S.C. §
153(44) (2006); Communications Act of 1934 § 201, 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
36. See PAGLIN, supra note 21, at 27-30, 30 n.40.
37. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276.
38. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976.

142

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:137

2. Information Services
Information services are not subject to common carrier regulation under
Title II as common carriers; instead, information services are subject to the
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction found in Title I.39 Section 4(i) in Title I of the
Communications Act provides that “[t]he Commission may perform any
and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not
inconsistent with this Act, as may be necessary in the execution of its
functions.”40 Traditionally, this ancillary jurisdiction vests the FCC with
power to lightly regulate information services to the extent that the FCC
acts pursuant to an authority-granting provision under Title I, and that the
regulation is “reasonably ancillary to the [FCC’s] effective performance of
its statutorily mandated responsibilities.”41 This provision was the issue at
the center of Comcast Corp. v. FCC,42 discussed in detail in Part IIIA, infra.
The FCC does wield some regulatory authority over information
services, which is defined by Congress in the Telecommunications Act.43
According to the Telecommunications Act, an information service is “the
offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications”44 This definition focuses primarily on the capacity or
ability to process information, as opposed to the actual means of merely
transporting the information.45 An information service processes
information and may use a telecommunication’s means to actually deliver
the information to the user. An information service is still properly defined
as an information service, even if it has an integrated telecommunications
component.46

39. Id.
40. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i).
41. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644-46 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
42. Id. at 642.
43. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 975-76.
44. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).
45. Id. The means of transporting information, on the other hand, is the primary focus
of the definition of telecommunications: “‘telecommunications’ means the transmission,
between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing,
without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(43).
46. In re Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 13 FCC Rcd. 11,501, 11,539 para. 80
(1998) (report to Congress) [hereinafter Universal Service Report].
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B. The Historical Origins of the Classification Framework
This dichotomy47 between telecommunications carriers and information
services originated in the 1960s and continued to develop through the mid1980s in the Computer Inquiry Proceedings.48 These proceedings constitute
three different sets of FCC regulations and declarations: Computer I, II, and
III.49
In 1970, the FCC issued Computer I to address company’s processing
and storing public data.50 In 1970, data processing meant the “‘use of a
computer for the processing of information as distinguished from circuit or
message-switching.’”51 To promote innovation and competition in the data
processing market, the FCC decided not to claim broad regulatory authority
over data processing services, thereby treating them differently than other
regulated communications services.52 Instead of imposing broad regulation
over data processing, the FCC determined that it would make the necessary
classification on a case-by-case basis for those services that combined
communications and data processing functions.53 While implementing this
regulation, however, the FCC realized that a case-by-case determination
would simply not suffice in light of new technological advances.54
In response to the problems arising under Computer I, the FCC issued
Computer II in 1980.55 In Computer II, the FCC distinguished between
“basic services” and “enhanced services.”56 It defined basic service as the
offering of “a pure transmission capability over a communications path that
47. Id. at 11,520 para. 39. This classification system is properly referred to as a
dichotomy because of Congress’s desire that the categories be mutually exclusive as
discussed in Part IV infra.
48. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976; accord Report and Order, supra note 23, at 14,866 para. 21.
49. In re Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer and Commc’n Servs. and Facilities, 28 F.C.C. 2d 291 (1970) [hereinafter
Computer I]; In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rule and Regulations, 77
F.C.C. 2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II]; In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the
Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C. 2d 958 (1986)
[hereinafter Computer III].
50. Report and Order, supra note 23, at 14,867 para. 22.
51. Id. at 14,867 n.55 (quoting Computer I, supra note 49, at 295 para. 15).
52. Id. at 14,867 para. 22.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 14,867 para. 23.
55. Computer II, supra note 49.
56. Report and Order, supra note 23, at 14,867 para. 23 (citing Computer II, supra note
49, at 435 para. 132).
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is virtually transparent in terms of its interactions with customer supplied
information.”57 On the other hand, it characterized enhanced service as
“any offering over the telecommunications network which is more than a
basic transmission service.”58 In this ruling, the FCC subjected basic services
to regulation as a common carrier under Title II of the Communications
Act.59 Computer II did not treat enhanced services as common carriers;
thus, enhanced services were not subject to broad regulation under Title II,
but were only subject to the light regulatory touch of the FCC’s ancillary
jurisdiction under Title I.60 The FCC believed this approach to be
appropriate because heavy common carrier regulation under Title II would
impede further innovation and betray the congressional policy of the
Communications Act.61 The FCC declared that even though enhanced
service has a telecommunications component, the primary purpose of such
service is data processing, which has never been regulated under Title II.62
Furthermore, the FCC believed that not subjecting enhanced service to
common carrier regulation under Title II was consistent with Congress’s
statutory objectives of promoting nation-wide communications service.63 In
this proceeding, however, the FCC did require enhanced services that
owned their own transmission facilities to lease their local transmission
lines to other enhanced services on a common carrier basis at the same
prices, terms, and conditions.64 This requirement has never applied to
enhanced services that did not own their own transmission lines, and the
requirement did not have an effect on the services offered to the public.65 In
Computer III, the FCC continued to distinguish basic services from
enhanced services under the same basic framework.66

57. Computer II, supra note 49, at 420 para. 96.
58. Id. at 420 para. 97.
59. Id. at 419 para. 92.
60. Id. at 435 para. 132.
61. Id. at 434 para. 129.
62. Id. at 435 para. 132.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 474 para. 231.
65. Letter from Robert M. McDowell, Comm’r, FCC, to Henry A. Waxman,
Representative, United States House of Representatives 1 (May 5, 2010),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-297934A1.pdf.
66. Report and Order, supra note 23, at 14,869 para. 26.
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When Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, it
maintained and integrated the same basic dichotomy.67 Thus, basic
services—like telecommunications services—are regulated as common
carriers, whereas enhanced services—like information services—are
regulated under the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction in Title I.68
C. Classification of Internet Access as an Information Service
Before Internet access services can be properly classified, it is important
to understand how the Internet is accessed. There are two ways to access the
Internet: the traditional dial-up method and broadband Internet service.69
The dial-up method, which is very slow, uses local telephone companies’
facilities to make “calls with computer modems through the telephone
wires.”70 Broadband Internet service, commonly referred to as high-speed
Internet, is the most common mode of Internet access today.71 Broadband
Internet service comes in a variety of ways: cable modem service that uses
cable lines owned by the cable companies to transmit data between the
Internet and users, digital subscriber line (DSL) that uses telephone lines
owned by local telephone companies,72 broadband over power lines,73 and
wireless broadband.74
There are two components of broadband Internet access: a
telecommunications component and an information service component.75
To determine how the Internet should be classified for regulatory purposes,
the FCC examined the Telecommunications Act and considered Congress’s
intent surrounding the Act, the legislative history of the Act, and the text of
the Act itself.76 With this background in mind, in 1998, the FCC declared in
its Universal Service Report77 that Internet access services were properly
67. Id. at 14,871 para. 29.
68. Id.
69. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 974-75
(2005).
70. Id.
71. See id. at 967.
72. Id.
73. Letter from Robert M. McDowell to Henry A. Waxman, supra note 65, at 3.
74. Id.
75. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 978-80.
76. Id. at 978-79; see also Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,539-40 para. 80.
77. The Universal Service Report was a report to Congress by the FCC: “On November
26, 1997, in a recent Appropriations Act, Congress directed the Commission to report to
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classified as information services, and should therefore be governed under
Title I of the Act.78 By evaluating the legislative history of the Act, the FCC
concluded that Congress intended to keep the Computer II framework and
to keep the Internet generally unregulated, but not under Title II.79
Moreover, the FCC determined that it was Congress’s intent to make the

Congress on the Commission’s implementation of certain provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 regarding the universal service system.” Universal Service
Report, supra note 46, at 11,502-03 para. 1. This report states that
the Appropriations Act requires the Commission to submit a report to
Congress . . . providing: a detailed description of the extent to which the
Commission’s interpretations . . . are consistent with the plain language of the
Communications Act of 1934 . . . as amended by the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, and shall include a review of—(1) the definitions of “information
service” . . . “telecommunications service” . . . and the impact of the
Commission’s interpretation of those definitions on the current and future
provision of universal service to consumers in all areas of the Nation . . . .
Id. at 11,502 n.1.
78. Id. at 11,527 para. 52.
79. Id. at 11,524 para. 45 (quoting Letter from Senator McCain at 1) (“Senator McCain
urges that Congress [never] intended to subject information services providers to the current
regulatory scheme applicable to common carriers . . . .”). Proponents of broadband Internet
access reclassification
claim that, until 2005, Internet access services had always been regulated as
Title II telecommunications services as a result of the Commission’s Computer
Inquiry rules. That view illogically conflates two distinct issues: the threshold
classification of a retail communications service as either an “information
service” or a “telecommunications service,” and the regulatory consequences
that the legacy Computer Inquiry rules attached to services classified as
“information services.” Those rules, which applied only to wireline common
carriers (and not cable modem service providers or wireless broadband
providers), did not affect the classification of retail Internet access service as an
information service. Instead, those rules required carriers offering Internet
access services to also separately offer the transmission component of their
Internet access services as a wholesale telecommunications service pursuant to
tariff. . . . And while the Computer Inquiry rules may have served the
Commission’s policy goals in the narrowband, circuit-switched “one-wire
world” for which they were initially created 40 years ago, they would be a
serious impediment to broadband investment and innovation in today’s multiplatform broadband IP environment, which is why the Commission has
categorically rejected applying those rules to cable, wireline and wireless
broadband providers.
Letter to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, 3-4 n.11 (Feb. 22, 2010),
http://netcompetition.org/Julius_Genachowski-Letter.pdf.
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classifications mutually exclusive.80 Therefore, a communication that is part
information service but uses a telecommunications component should be
regulated as a whole in one category, not split and regulated under both
categories.81
Considering the text of the Act itself, the FCC concluded that the
Internet does employ a telecommunications component, simply because it
is necessary for an Internet access service to transport data between
computers to provide access to the Internet.82 The Internet, however, is
classified as an information service because it “offers end users information
service capabilities inextricably intertwined with data transport.”83 In other
words, although the Internet uses telecommunications to transport the
information, Internet access is considered an information service because
consumers use the telecommunications component solely to access
information on the Internet. In 2005, the FCC employed this very analysis
to argue that cable modem services were properly classified as information
services pursuant to its 2002 Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling.84 In Brand X
Internet Services, the Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s classification of
cable modem service as an information service.85 In response, the FCC then
formally classified the remaining broadband services as information
services.86
In sum, no part of broadband Internet access has ever been regulated as a
telecommunications service even though Internet access has a
80.
81.
82.
83.

Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,520 para. 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11,539-40 para. 80. In this Universal Service Report, the FCC stated that
[t]he provision of Internet access service involves data transport elements:
an Internet access provider must enable the movement of information between
customers’ own computers and the distant computers with which those
customers seek to interact. But the provision of Internet access service crucially
involves information-processing elements as well; it offers end users
information-service capabilities inextricably intertwined with data transport.

Id.
84. In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling].
85. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)
(giving great deference to the FCC’s interpretation of the Communications Act of 1934 as
amended in 1996).
86. Letter from Robert M. McDowell to Henry A. Waxman, supra note 65, at 3 (stating
that “the Commission without dissent issued a series of orders classifying all broadband
services as information services: wireline (2005), powerline (2006) and wireless (2007)”).
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telecommunications component. Rather, the FCC has interpreted the
Communications Act and the Telecommunications Act to mean that
broadband Internet access should be regulated as an information service,
subject only to the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction under Title I.87
III. THE FCC’S PROBLEM—REGULATING INTERNET ACCESS
A. Comcast Corp. v. FCC
Until Comcast Corp. v. FCC in 2010, the FCC exercised its ancillary
authority to regulate Internet Service Providers (ISPs) under Title I of the
Communications Act.88 This case challenged the FCC’s understanding of its
ancillary jurisdiction. To understand why the FCC is considering
reclassifying broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service,
Comcast Corp. must be fully analyzed.
1. Background to Comcast Corp. v. FCC
The dispute that gave rise to the lawsuit started in 2007, when Comcast’s
customers were confronted with the problem of using BitTorrent.89
BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer Internet application that allows for faster
Internet data sharing.90 To understand how peer-to-peer file sharing
operates, it is imperative to have a basic understanding of the mechanics of
the Internet. The following describes the inter-workings of the Internet:
The Internet uses “packet switched” communications in
which information exchanged between two computers is broken
into multiple packets of data, which are transmitted
individually—but not necessarily by the same route—to their
destination. At the destination, the data packets are reassembled
into their original order. There is no need for an exclusive path
between the two endpoints.

87. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 989.
88. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 12, at para. 1.
89. Brief for Respondents at 8, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(No. 08-1291), 2009 WL 3557928. BitTorrent allows users to share files such as music,
movies, and photographs over the Internet.
90. Id. at 8-9. (“Peer-to-peer networking supports the Internet-based distribution of
video programming . . . Peer-to-peer technology can also support other applications,
including the provision of voice service. Skype, for example, uses peer-to-peer applications in
its Internet-based voice communications business.”).
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The creation and transmission of data packets are governed by
standardized rules, called protocols, the most common of which
is the Transmission Control Protocol or TCP, which
continuously monitors the user’s connection to ensure that
packets are delivered without error and in the correct sequence.
Under TCP, if the computer at either end of the communications
link detects a problem in the connection, it sends a reset or RST
packet, which signals that the current connection should be
terminated and a new one established.91
Peer-to-peer file sharing, such as BitTorrent, differs greatly from
traditional methods of sharing data.92 Under the traditional method, “a
complete copy of a content file (such as a song or a feature-length movie) is
stored on servers and distributed from there to end users that request it.”93
With peer-to-peer file sharing, the files are disassembled into small pieces,
sent to be stored on different end users’ computers, and can be accessed by
multiple computers.94 For example, when a person downloads a movie
through BitTorrent, different parts of the movie are received at the same
time from other BitTorrent users that have the same movie.95 Thus, an
Internet user that downloads a movie from the Internet using BitTorrent
actually downloads pieces of the requested movie from many other Internet
users’ computers. The consequence of BitTorrent and peer-to-peer filesharing is that end users’ computers become servers for these files that are
requested through the file-sharing application.96 This type of file-sharing
ameliorates the need to have substantial amounts of holding space for large
amounts of data being requested at once, and it helps to alleviate “the
upload chokepoint that would occur if one user attempted to send a large
file to another user.”97
In 2007, it was alleged that Comcast was interfering with its customers’
BitTorrent applications.98 Later, Comcast admitted to interfering with
91. Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted); see also In re Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub.
Knowledge, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028, para. 3 (2008) [hereinafter Complaint].
92. Comments of AT&T, Inc. to FCC, supra note 10, at 73-74.
93. Id.
94. Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 10; Comments of AT&T, Inc. to FCC, supra
note 10, at 74.
95. Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 10.
96. Comments of AT&T, Inc. to FCC, supra note 10, at 74.
97. Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 10.
98. Id. at 11.
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BitTorrent file-sharing because of the congestion it caused on Comcast’s
network.99 This interference was effectuated by using “deep packet
inspection,”100 which targets individual packets of information to determine
whether the packet is using BitTorrent technology.101 If Comcast
determined that a packet was using BitTorrent, it sent an RST packet102 that
effectively terminated the connection, thus making the end user find
another source for the requested information.103 Comcast first claimed to
take this action only to help ameliorate network congestion during high
Internet-usage periods, but later admitted to interfering at all times of the
day.104
After several complaints, the FCC intervened to enjoin Comcast’s
interference with peer-to-peer file-sharing over the Internet.105 The FCC

99. Reply Brief for Petitioner Comcast Corp. at 3 n.1, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d
642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 08-1291), 2009 WL 3557932. In its brief, Comcast argued that
“these practices were designed in good faith to manage high volumes of traffic to ensure that
all customers could use and enjoy their High-Speed Internet services.” Id. “In particular, the
contested practices affected less than 10% of peer-to-peer uploads (without affecting any
downloads), and any delay lasted less than one minute in 80% of cases. Comcast also
comprehensively disclosed the practices to customers by January 2008.” Id. (citation
omitted).
100. Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 11.
101. Id. at 11-12.
102. When information is exchanged between computers, Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) continually monitors the exchange to ensure that the information is
exchanged in the correct sequence and without error. If the computer detects an error at
either end of the exchange, it sends an RST packet (reset packet) to terminate the exchange.
Id. at 9-10.
103. Id. In its brief, the FCC stated that
[i]n some cases, particularly involving material that is not popular (and thus
not located on many users’ computers), the information may not be available
elsewhere, in which case the requesting user—who could be a customer of
Comcast or another service provider—is effectively disabled from downloading
the information. In other cases, the material may be available on another
computer using a service provider that does not block uploads. The latter
outcome can both delay the customer’s receipt of the data and shift traffic from
Comcast’s network to the non-blocking service provider’s network.
Id. at 11-12.
104. Id. at 13.
105. Id. at 15-17; see also Complaint, supra note 91.
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claimed jurisdiction106 over Comcast pursuant to the congressional intent
stated in the opening paragraph of the Communications Act,107 the ancillary
jurisdiction provision within the statute,108 and Congress’s Internet policy
statement.109 After the FCC contacted and proceeded against Comcast
regarding its network practices involving BitTorrent, Comcast ceased its
interfering behavior.110 To ensure that Comcast did indeed stop interfering,
the FCC ordered111 Comcast to submit a report to the FCC describing
Comcast’s old network practices and a description of the new planned
procedures.112 Soon after receiving the order, Comcast challenged it in
federal court.113
2. The Appeals Court’s Determination
Pursuant to the Communications Act, courts have developed a two-part
test to determine whether the FCC has jurisdiction to regulate information
services.114 The FCC may regulate “only when two conditions are satisfied:
(1) the Commission’s general jurisdictional grant under Title I [of the
Communications Act] covers the regulated subject and (2) the regulations
are reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its
statutorily mandated responsibilities.”115 Under the first prong of the test,
Comcast conceded that its Internet service was well within Title I’s
requirement116 of “interstate and foreign commerce in communication by

106. This jurisdiction was found in the FCC’s ancillary authority granted by Congress
under Title I of the Communications Act. Because Internet access is an information service,
it is not subject to common carrier regulation found in Title II of the Act.
107. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006); see also Complaint, supra
note 91, at para. 16.
108. 47 U.S.C. § 154(i); see also Complaint, supra note 91, at para. 15.
109. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b). “The Commission found in particular that Comcast’s practices
present both a ‘risk to the open nature of the Internet’—in violation of federal Internet
policies that favor maximum customer choice of Internet content and applications—and a
‘danger of network management practices being used to further anticompetitive ends.’” Brief
for Respondents, supra note 89, at 14; see also Complaint, supra note 91, at para. 13.
110. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
111. Complaint, supra note 91, at para. 54.
112. Id.; Brief for Respondents, supra note 89, at 17-18.
113. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 645.
114. Id. at 646.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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wire.”117 The main issue, then, was whether the FCC’s regulations fell within
the authority granted to it by Congress.118
The FCC argued that its regulations were ancillary to the authority
delegated to it by Congress under sections 230(b), 151, and 4(i) of the
Communications Act.119 First, the FCC argued that Comcast’s
discriminatory practice of interfering with BitTorrent file-sharing frustrated
Congress’s Internet policy stated in section 230(b) of the Act.120 That
portion states that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to promote the
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer
services.”121 Second, the FCC argued that Comcast’s practices violated the
very reason for creating the FCC—to regulate interstate communication by
wire or radio, to make it available to everyone in the United States without
discrimination.122 Third, the FCC further argued that under section 4(i) of
the Act, Congress delegated it the authority to make the necessary
regulation involved in this case.123
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected each of these arguments,
concluding that the regulatory provisions were rooted only in congressional
policy, not in an individual grant of authority.124 After analyzing four
previous cases, the court stated “that policy statements alone cannot
provide the basis for the Commission’s exercise of ancillary authority—
derives from the ‘axiomatic’ principle that ‘administrative agencies may
[act] only pursuant to authority delegated to them by Congress.’”125
Although policy statements provide insight into the mind of Congress,
policy statements cannot be said to be delegations of authority.126
Furthermore, the Court found that the FCC’s interpretation of its ancillary
authority in Section 4(i) would leave the FCC “virtually free . . . from its

117. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
118. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 647.
119. Id. 651-55.
120. Id. at 651-52 (arguing that such discriminatory practices did not promote the
development of the Internet and interactive computer services).
121. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
122. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 651-52; see also 47 U.S.C. § 151.
123. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 655. “The Commission may perform any and all acts,
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as
may be necessary in the execution of its functions.” 47 U.S.C. § 154(i).
124. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 654.
125. Id. at 654 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
126. Id.

2011]

RECLASSIFYING BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS

153

congressional tether” and “unbounded.”127 Therefore, unless a policy
statement is coupled with an individual grant of power, the FCC does not
have jurisdiction to regulate an information service.128
The FCC also argued that sections 706 and 256 are grants of authority
from which the FCC could regulate.129 Even though sections 706130 and
256131 may offer grants of authority, the court rejected the FCC’s argument
because the FCC had previously determined that those sections do “not
constitute an independent grant . . . of authority to employ other regulating
methods.”132 Therefore, the court determined that the FCC would be bound

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 655.
Id.
Id. at 658-60.
Section 706 states the following:
The Commission . . . shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans . . . by
utilizing . . . price cap regulation, regulatory forbearance, measures that
promote competition in the local telecommunications market, or other
regulating methods that remove barriers to infrastructure investment.
Communications Act of 1934 § 706, 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006).
131. Section 256 states in pertinent part:
In carrying out the purposes of this section, the Commission—
[s]hall establish procedures for Commission oversight of coordinated
network planning by telecommunications carriers and other providers of
telecommunications service for the effective and efficient interconnection of
public telecommunications networks used to provide telecommunications
service. . . .
....
Nothing in this section shall be construed as expanding or limiting any
authority that the Commission may have under law.
47 U.S.C. § 256(b)(1), (c).
132. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 658-59. On December 23, 2010, the FCC instituted new
rules to regulate specific conduct of Internet access providers through section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Indus.
Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, para. 117 (2010). The Commission reasoned that section 706
gives express authority to “encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunications
capability by any of the means listed in the provision,” which includes broadband Internet
access. Id. at para. 119. Although it is unclear whether this section is actually an independent
grant of authority that the FCC may use to regulate ISPs, the D.C. Circuit opined that it is
“arguable.” See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658. The merit of the FCC’s argument pursuant to
section 706, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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by its previous ruling that those sections were not grants of regulatory
authority.133
The court held that although Congress delegated the FCC great authority
to regulate communications by wire, Congress did not delegate unbounded
power.134 Because the FCC failed to tether any of the policy statements in
the Act to individual grants of authority, the court held that the FCC did
not have the jurisdiction to impose such regulation on Comcast.135
B. The FCC’s Plan to Reclassify Broadband Internet Access as a
Telecommunications Service
The court’s decision confused the FCC regarding its jurisdictional reach
to regulate information services pursuant to its ancillary authority.136 Prior
to this decision, the FCC believed that it had sufficient authority to regulate
information services so long as the regulation fell within Congress’s policy
goals.137 Pursuant to its ancillary authority found in section 4(i), the FCC
believed it could institute the necessary regulations.138 Comcast caused the
FCC to question its understanding of its ancillary authority.139 Following
that case, the FCC immediately sent out a Notice of Inquiry140 asking for
public comment regarding the FCC’s jurisdiction and what policy changes
it could effectuate to have more regulatory authority over similar future
practices.141 The FCC’s general counsel, Austin Schlick, believes that the
Comcast decision will only foster more litigation and uncertainty regarding
the FCC’s ancillary authority.142 In its first step towards implementing
regulation, the FCC invited public comment on the issue of reclassifying
broadband Internet access from an information service to a
telecommunications service.143
133. Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658.
134. Id. at 661.
135. Id.
136. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 12, at para. 1.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. New Proposal to Reclassify Broadband Services as Telecommunications Services Issued
by US Federal Communications Commission, MAYERBROWN.COM (May 7, 2010),
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=8957&nid=6.
142. Id.
143. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 12.
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In this Notice of Inquiry, the FCC sought comment on three specific
issues:
First, we ask whether the current information service
classification of broadband Internet service can still support
effective performance of the Commission’s core responsibilities.
Second, we ask for comment on the legal and practical
consequences of classifying the Internet connectivity component
of broadband Internet service as a “telecommunications service”
to which the full weight of Title II requirements would apply,
and whether such a classification would accurately reflect the
current market facts. Finally, we identify and invite comment on
a third way, under which the Commission would classify the
Internet connectivity portion of broadband Internet service as a
telecommunications service but would simultaneously forbear,
using the section 10 authority Congress delegated to us, from all
but a small handful of provisions.”144
To be sure, the FCC expressly stated that it would not consider the issues
of regulating Internet applications or the content of the Internet.145
Furthermore, it is also not concerned with Internet facilities or services such
as the “Internet backbone, content delivery networks (CDNs), over-the-top
video services, or voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) telephony
services.”146 Instead, the FCC sought comment on regulation over
broadband Internet service providers, and whether it could single out and
regulate the connectivity component of wireline broadband Internet
providers.147 Congress did not, however, delegate the authority to the FCC
to reclassify broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service or
to treat it as more than one offering.148 Such a reclassification would
frustrate Congress’s intent for the regulation of the Internet.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at para. 28.
Id. at para. 10.
Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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C. The FCC Only Has the Authority Delegated to It by Congress
Article I of the United States Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted . . . in a Congress of the United States.”149 Congress may
delegate its legislative authority to an agency, provided that Congress
provides intelligible standards to regulate the delegation of power.150 Even
though the principal purpose of intelligible standards is to ensure that
delegations of power comport with the strictures of the Constitution, those
standards also provide boundaries so that an agency is less likely to overstep
its bounds or to arbitrarily exercise its authority.151
It is a cardinal rule of administrative law that an administrative agency
only has the specific authority delegated to it by Congress152 and may not
act beyond its delegated powers.153 “[A]n agency’s power is no greater than
that delegated to it by Congress.”154 If an administrative agency acts beyond
its delegated authority, the courts are bound to hold the actions “ultra
vires155 . . . or a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.”156 The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) states that “[t]he reviewing court
shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right.”157 Since Congress delegates
authority to agencies through legislation, the enabling statute establishes the
parameters of an agency’s authority to act.158 In this case, the APA warrants
an examination into the FCC’s plan to reclassify broadband Internet access
to determine whether such a reclassification comports with the strictures of
the Communications Act as amended by the Telecommunications Act.

149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
150. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
151. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
152. Catholic Health Initiatives v. Sebelius, 617 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J.,
concurring).
153. Id.
154. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986).
155. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ultra vires” as “[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of
power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1525
(9th ed. 2009).
156. Catholic Health Initiatives, 617 F.3d at 497 (Brown, J., concurring).
157. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006).
158. Catholic Health Initiatives, 617 F.3d at 497 (Brown, J., concurring).
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IV. CONGRESS DID NOT DELEGATE BROAD INTERNET REGULATORY
AUTHORITY TO THE FCC
Sixty-two years after creating the FCC and delegating it the authority to
regulate interstate communication by wire,159 Congress passed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 with the intention of de-regulating and
promoting competition for telecommunication and information services.160
Although Internet service providers are not expressly mentioned as either a
telecommunications service or an information service, the text of the
Telecommunications Act and the legislative history reflect Congress’s desire
to leave Internet access services open to the market, not subjecting it or any
component thereof to Title II regulation as a common carrier.161
A. Congress Codified the FCC’s Computer II Regulatory Dichotomy into
Statutory Law
1.
Basic and Enhanced Services as Telecommunication and
Information Services
As discussed in Part II supra, in the 1980 Computer II proceeding, the
FCC developed a classification scheme between basic service and enhanced
service.162 Basic service was the transportation of information through wires
without a change in the form or content of the information.163 On the other
hand, enhanced service
combines basic service with computer processing applications
that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects
of the subscriber’s transmitted information, or provide the

159. Communications Act of 1934 § 1, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
160. S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
161. In the 15 years since Congress passed this Act, the FCC has stated time and again
that its interpretation of the 1996 Act leads it to the conclusion that broadband Internet
access providers are information services. It does appear, however, that the FCC believes that
Congress left it with unprecedented authority to decide how to classify Internet access. This
Note proposes that Congress intended Internet access to be an information service and that
the entire service delivered to the public should be regulated as an information service, not
split into two parts.
162. See Computer II, supra note 49, at 387 para. 5.
163. Id. at 420 para. 96.
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subscriber additional, different, or restructured information, or
involve subscriber interaction with stored information.164
The Telecommunications Act mirrors this paradigm, codifying
Congress’s intention that the classifications be the same. The Act provides
that telecommunications is the transmission of information that does not
manipulate its form or content but delivers the information in its original
form.165 This definition not only mirrors the FCC’s definition of basic
service in Computer II, but also is the same characterization: a transmission
without a change in the form or content of the information.166 On the other
side of the dichotomy, an information service, while utilizing a
telecommunications component to transport the information, does
manipulate the information transmitted.167 The two definitions—
information and enhanced services—both include services having the
capability to process information and then transmit it in a different form or
with different content.168 Therefore, when Congress enacted the
Telecommunications Act, it used different terms to define virtually the
exact same dichotomy previously developed by the FCC.
The Act’s legislative history provides evidence that Congress specifically
intended to build upon the old Computer II framework, making the old
basic and enhanced services into their modern-day counterpart:
telecommunication and information services, respectively. Before enacting
the 1996 Act, a House of Representatives report stated that it relied on a
1983 Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) for its definition of

164. Id. at 387 para. 5.
165. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (2006) (“The term
‘telecommunications’ means the transmission between or among points specified by the
user, or information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or content of the
information as sent and received.”).
166. Id.
167. 47 U.S.C. § 153(20). An “information service” is defined as
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include
any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications
service.
Id.
168. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(20), with 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2010) (demonstrating that
both definitions require capability of processing information and interacting with the
subscriber).
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telecommunication and information services.169 In a settlement agreement
(known as the MFJ) between the Department of Justice and AT&T and its
affiliates, the District Court for the District of Columbia listed terms and
definitions that it used throughout the opinion in approving the
settlement.170 In this MFJ, the court defined the terms
“telecommunications” and “information service,” giving the terms the
definition that Congress later codified in the Telecommunications Act,
word for word.171 In its opinion, the court expressly stated that Computer
II’s enhanced service is the equivalent to information services used by the
court in the settlement agreement.172 Likewise, in a Senate committee report
in 1995, the Senate expressly stated that an information service is “similar to
the FCC’s definition of ‘enhanced services.’”173
When Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act, many
information services had been operating without Title II regulation under
the Computer II framework, which had existed for sixteen years.174 Congress
was well-aware of this dichotomy and could have expressly altered the
previous framework, but there is no mention of any such intent anywhere
in the congressional record. Congress’s awareness of the dichotomy is
exhibited by the House report that expressly stated that the definitions in
the House bill were based on the definitions provided in the MFJ.175
Furthermore, the Senate committee report conclusively conveyed its
knowledge that the term “information service” set forth in its bill, which
eventually became law, was “similar to the FCC definition of ‘enhanced
services.’”176 Surely Congress would understand the ramifications of its
decision to use those definitions and not expressly state its intent to regulate
information services. By stating its awareness of the previous classification
system and not expressly providing for any change, it is evident that
Congress intended to incorporate the FCC’s existing regulatory framework

169. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 125 (1995).
170. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 229 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 178 n.198.
173. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 18 (1995).
174. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,524 para. 45.
175. H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 125.
176. S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 18.
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established in 1980.177 Before the Act was passed, the FCC could have
instituted proceedings to change its classification scheme upon a showing
that was not arbitrary or capricious,178 but once Congress codified into law
the FCC’s dichotomy, it became set in stone until Congress changes course
via new legislation.179
This conclusion should not come as a shock by any means. Just after
passage of the 1996 Act, the FCC sought public comment on whether
Congress had codified the previous dichotomy between enhanced service
and basic service.180 “Virtually all parties that commented on this issue agree
that the statutory term ‘information services’ encompasses all activities that
fall within the Commission’s definition of ‘enhanced services.’”181 From the
inception of this Act, it is commonly believed by most that Congress indeed
incorporated the FCC’s classification system into statutory law.182
Under the Computer II framework, basic services were regulated in
accordance with Title II of the Communications Act, and enhanced services
were exempt because the FCC believed regulating enhanced services would
stifle innovation.183 Only basic services were subject to regulation.184 By
using the MFJ definitions that built upon the Computer II terms, Congress

177. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,519 para. 37 (citing Letter from
Senator McCain at 1). Senator McCain urged that
in defining ‘telecommunications,’ ‘telecommunications service’ and
‘information service,’ Congress ‘distinguished between information services
and telecommunication services to reflect the distinction set forth on the
Modification of Final Judgment and the Commission’s Second Computer
Inquiry proceeding between those services that offer pure transmission capacity
and others that somehow enhance the transmission capacity.’ An information
service, he continues, ‘is the offering of particular capabilities via
telecommunications, but is itself not telecommunications or a
telecommunications service.
Id.
178. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
179. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).
180. In re Implementation of the Non-accounting Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of
the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, 11 FCC Rcd. 21,905, 21,954 para. 99 (1997).
181. Id. at 21,954 para. 100. The FCC further declared, however, that all enhanced
services are information services, but not all information services are enhanced services.
Information services should be interpreted more broadly. Id. at 21,956 para. 103.
182. Id. at 21,954 para. 100.
183. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,513 para. 26.
184. See id. at 11,521-14 paras. 22-28.
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must have intended for information services—the modern-day counterpart
to enhanced services—to be exempt from Title II regulation also.
2. Information and Telecommunication Services as Mutually Exclusive
Not only did Congress intend to treat information services as the
previous enhanced service classification, but it intended that information
and telecommunications services be mutually exclusive. First, the FCC
expressly stated in Computer II that it would not regulate enhanced services
under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, but that it would
regulate basic services.185 Thus, enhanced services were mutually exclusive
to basic services.186 A particular service was regulated only as one or the
other. Second, in Computer II, the FCC determined that even though
enhanced services might use both a communications service and a data
processing component, it would be considered an enhanced service
nonetheless.187
In the Act, Congress codified this idea in the definition of an information
service—a capability that is offered via telecommunications.188 Even though
an information service has a telecommunications component, it is still
considered an information service.189 From the definition provided in the
Act, it is clear that the transmission of information chosen by the user
without a change in the form or content of the information is a
telecommunications service.190 It becomes an information service, however,
when the service offers the capability to store, transform, and process
information simply by using a telecommunications component.191 Thus, a
particular service is either one that does not change the chosen content or
form of the information (telecommunications service), or it is a service that
has capabilities to store, transform, and process information using a
telecommunications component (an information service).192 The Supreme
Court affirmed this mutually exclusive classification as being consistent
with the Communications Act as amended by the Telecommunications

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Computer II, supra note 49, at 435 para. 132.
47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2010).
Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,513 para. 27.
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 3, 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006).
Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,520 para. 39.
47 U.S.C. § 153(43), (46).
Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,521 para. 41.
Compare 47 U.S.C. § 153(43), (46) with 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
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Act.193 Therefore, the text and history of the classification framework
support the proposition that the two classifications are mutually exclusive.
This is consistent with the legislative history of the Telecommunications
Act. The intent of both the House and the Senate bills indicates that
Congress intended telecommunication and information services to be
mutually exclusive. The House of Representatives’s bill stated that a
“telecommunications service . . . does not include an information
service.”194 In a committee report, the Senate declared that the definition of
telecommunications “excludes those services . . . that are defined as
information services.”195 In the same report, the Senate reasoned that
“[i]nformation service providers do not ‘provide’ telecommunications
services; they are users of telecommunications services. The definition of
telecommunications service specifically excludes the offering of information
services (as opposed to the transmission of such services for a fee) precisely
to avoid imposing common carrier obligations on information service
providers.”196 Thus, both chambers of Congress specifically intended that
each service was mutually exclusive from the other. A service may be
regulated as either service according to its nature, but may not be regulated
as both.
Congress, knowing the FCC’s history of not regulating enhanced
services, intentionally codified the same regulatory framework in the
Telecommunications Act. Both chambers of Congress manifested their
desire to have mutually exclusive categories of services, even though an
information service may have a telecommunications component.
3. Congress’s Intent
This interpretation is consistent with Congress’s express intent in
enacting the Telecommunications Act—to promote competition and
deregulation for new telecommunications technologies.197 The Senate bill
stated that its purpose was “to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory
national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector
deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies

193. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973-77
(2005).
194. H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. § 501(50) (1995).
195. S. REP. No. 104-23, at 18 (1995).
196. Id. at 28.
197. Report and Order, supra note 23, at 14,856 n.8 (citing Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)).
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and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to
competition . . . .”198 Likewise, the House stated that its goal was also to
promote competition and “reduce regulation.”199 These policy statements
are important for two reasons. First, these were the same reasons employed
by the FCC in 1980 in Computer II when it decided not to regulate
enhanced services.200 The FCC thought that Title II regulation would harm
innovation and competition.201 Congress, in 1995, had the same policy
considerations as the FCC had in 1980 evidencing that Congress intended
to maintain the FCC’s deregulatory policies and even wrote them into
statutory law in the 1996 Act. Second, if Congress indeed did intend to
change course and submit information services or enhanced services to
common carrier regulation, Congress’s policy to promote de-regulation and
competition would not have lined up with its intent. Up until this time,
information services had been basically free of regulation and had seen
great improvements and innovation due to competition.202 Congress must
have intended to continue the FCC’s path of de-regulation to meet its goals.
B. Congress Intended for Internet Access Services to be Information Services
In the Telecommunications Act, Congress did not explicitly state that
Internet access services were information services. It is apparent, however,

198.
199.
200.
201.

S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 1.
H.R. 1555, 104th Cong. (1995).
Computer II, supra note 49, at 426-27 para. 109.
Id. In this regulation, the FCC stated:
To fully appreciate the significance of this, it is helpful to understand the
dynamics of the marketplace in light of our current regulatory scheme. There
are literally thousands of unregulated computer service vendors offering
competing services connected to the interstate telecommunications network.
The services they provide are many and varied. The only limitation on the types
of services offered are those arising from the constraints of their own
entrepreneurial capabilities and, in a very real sense, the implicit requirement
that they structure their services so as to avoid crossing a regulatory boundary
that would subject them to regulation. . . . By removing this barrier the entire
market for enhanced services should be even more competitive than it has been
in the presence of that barrier. . . . The record in this proceeding makes clear
that even when the Commission’s stated policies are in favor of open entry, the
very presence of Title II requirements inhibits a truly competitive, consumer
responsive market.

Id.
202. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4), (b)(2) (2006).
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that Congress contemplated the Internet when it enacted the Act.203 Senator
McCain urged that “[i]t certainly was not Congress’s intent in enacting the
supposedly pro-competitive, deregulatory 1996 Act to extend the burdens of
current Title II regulation to Internet services, which historically have been
excluded from regulation.”204 This sentiment was echoed by “Senators
Ashcroft, Ford, John F. Kerry, Abraham and Wyden emphasiz[ing] that
nothing in the 1996 Act or its legislative history suggests that Congress
intended to alter the current classification of Internet . . . services . . . .”205
1. The Text of the Telecommunications Act
Broadband Internet access fits squarely within the definition of an
information service. As Justice Thomas argued:
A user cannot reach a third party’s Web site without DNS, which
(among other things) matches the Web site address the end user
types into his browser . . . with the IP address of the Web page’s
host server. []For an internet user, “DNS is a must. . . . [N]early
all of the Internet’s network services use DNS. That includes the
World Wide Web, electronic mail, remote terminal access, and
file transfer”[]. . . . Similarly, the Internet service provided by
cable companies facilitates access to third-party Web pages by
offering consumers the ability to store, or “cache,” popular
content on local computer servers. . . . In other words,
subscribers can reach third-party Web sites via “the World Wide
Web, and browse their contents, only because their service
provider offers the ‘capability for . . . acquiring, [storing] . . .
retrieving [and] utilizing . . . information.’” “The service that
Internet access providers offer to members of the public is
Internet access,” not a transparent ability (from the end user’s
perspective) to transmit information.206
This has not changed since it was stated by Justice Thomas in 2005 and
reaffirmed by the FCC in 2007.207 Broadband providers today provide even
203. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)–(b).
204. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,519 para. 37 (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Letter from Senator McCain at 2).
205. Id. at 11,520 para. 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. Letter to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, supra note 79, at 7-8 (citation
omitted) (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
999-1000 (Thomas, J.)).
207. Id.
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more functionalities than before. These added functionalities include
“security screening, spam protection, anti-virus and anti-botnet
technologies, pop-up blockers, parental controls, online email and photo
storage, instant messaging, and the ability to create a customized
browser . . . .”208 From the user’s perspective, broadband Internet access
providers offer much more than a pure transmission, but instead offer a
completely integrated offering of access to the Internet along with other
features. Accordingly, broadband Internet access providers are properly
classified as information services, fitting within the definition prescribed by
Congress.
Although the text of the Act does not explicitly state that ISPs are
information services, the language certainly implies it. Section 230 of the
Telecommunications Act, also known as the Communications Decency Act
of 1996,209 evidences Congress’s intent to consider ISPs as information
services.210 This section immunized providers and users of interactive
computer services from restricting access in good faith to “material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material
is constitutionally protected.”211 Furthermore, it immunized ISPs from
liability stemming from access services provided to content providers of
obscene material.212
Within the definitions provided in this section, “Interactive computer
service” is defined as “any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by
libraries or educational institutions.”213 First, it is notable that the definition
limits the criteria to information services, systems, or access software
providers, with no mention of telecommunications services.214 Second, it

208. Id. “In many cases, these network security-related features are fully integrated with
the Internet access service offering; a consumer cannot utilize the service without also
receiving the functionality provided by these security mechanisms.” Id. at 9.
209. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 501, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 133
(1996).
210. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
211. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
212. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B).
213. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
214. Id.
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recognizes that information services provide “access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet . . . .”215 This definition describes precisely what ISPs
do—provide access to servers and the Internet. If ISPs were to be treated as
telecommunications services, then this section would have no bearing on
what it purports to regulate. At the very least, it seems incredible that
Congress would intend for ISPs to be considered information services for
purposes of section 230, but for every other purpose, allow the FCC to
decide how to define ISPs. This would only foster confusion and litigation.
Furthermore, if Congress intended to have ISPs be defined as
telecommunications services, Congress surely would have included
telecommunications services within the definition of interactive computer
services, or Congress may have included interactive computer services
within the definition of telecommunication services or common carriers.
Courts have found section 230 to encompass ISPs as information
services. In America Online, Inc. v. Greatdeals.net, America Online, Inc.
(AOL), formerly one of the largest ISPs in the United States, brought suit
against Martindale Empowerment to enjoin it from sending unsolicited,
bulk email advertisements to AOL’s customers.216 Under the definition of
interactive computer service in section 230 of the Telecommunications Act,
the court found that AOL, as an Internet provider, was properly classified as
an information service and should not be regulated under the antidiscriminatory provisions relating to common carriers.217 Although the
court deferred to the FCC’s interpretation of the statute, the court found
that it was a reasonable interpretation with much support in the text of the
statute.218 The court stated that “[i]f Congress had intended to include
interactive computer services or information service providers like AOL in
the definition of common carrier, it would have so indicated.”219 Therefore,
AOL was considered an information service not subject to regulation under
Title II of the Act.220

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Am. Online, Inc. v. Greatdeals.net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 854 (E.D. Va. 1999).
Id. at 855-57.
Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 855-57.
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2. Congress’s Stated Policy in the Act
In the congressional findings and policy provided in the Act, Congress
clearly manifested its intent to shelter the Internet and Internet providers
from regulation. First, Congress made a number of findings that it
transcribed in the Act:
The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to individual Americans represent an
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources . . . .
....
The Internet and other interactive computer services have
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation.221
Congress specifically recognized that up until this point, the Internet and
Internet providers were subject to only minimal government regulation.222
Not only were they subject to minimal regulation, but it “flourished”223 and
developed rapidly under the FCC’s classification system.224
Second, Congress stated:
It is the policy of the United States—
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation . . . .225
In reading the findings and policy statements together, it is abundantly
clear that Congress did not institute any kind of change, but intended to
keep the status quo. Congress intended to preserve the “vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet.”226 Congress
was aware of the regulatory landscape at the time of the Act and expressly
stated its intention to keep that same framework.227 Furthermore, the phrase
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1), (4) (2006).
47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4).
Id.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1), (4).
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2) (emphasis added).
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added).
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4), (b)(2).
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“unfettered by Federal and State regulation”228 expressly shows Congress’s
de-regulatory Internet policy. Congress recognized the innovation and
progress the Internet has made and intended to keep the status quo, which
was minimal federal and state regulation. In enacting this policy in the Act,
in essence, Congress set in stone its desire to keep the Internet and
interactive computer services open, free from oppressive regulation.
Some argue that the findings and policy portions of section 230 are
merely describing the status of the Internet.229 Namely, that Congress found
that only the Internet—not ISPs—was free from federal or state
regulation.230 This finding, however, not only states that the Internet has
flourished due to minimal governmental regulation, but also that interactive
computer services have flourished as well.231 Again, interactive computer
services are defined as information services that provide access to server
computers or the Internet—ISPs232 Even courts have interpreted that
definition as including ISPs.233 In the policy section of 230, interactive
computer services are included along with the Internet—evidencing
Congress’s intent that the present non-regulatory landscape should remain
the same. Therefore, section 230 applies to the Internet as well as ISPs.
Even if the congressional intent in the Act is unclear, Congress’s silence
evidences its approval of the FCC’s policies of not classifying any part of
broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service. “When an
agency adheres consistently to a particular view of statutory meaning, and
Congress is aware of the agency’s interpretation and takes no action to
correct it, Congress’s inaction is persuasive evidence that the interpretation
is the one intended by Congress.”234 In the FCC’s 1998 report to Congress,
the FCC made expressly clear that it would not regulate Internet access
providers as common carriers under Title II.235 The FCC continued this
228. Id.
229. See Marvin Ammori, Letter from Marvin Ammori, General Counsel, Free Press, to
Marlene H. Dortch, Federal Communications Commission, 957 PLI/PAT 591, 623-27 (2009).
230. Id.
231. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4).
232. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
233. See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658-60 (7th Cir. 2003); Am. Online, Inc. v.
Greatdeals.net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 854-57 (E.D. Va. 1999).
234. Letter from Seth P. Waxman, Counsel for the United States Telecomm. Ass’n, to
Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC 9 (April 28, 2010) (citing CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S.
367, 382-85 (1981)), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/agep/conferences/
documents/AGEP_Data_Privacy_Byrd2.pdf.
235. See Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,540 para. 80.
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course in 2002, 2005, 2006, and 2007 as it formally classified all types of
broadband Internet services as information services.236 Furthermore, the
FCC always classified the entire broadband Internet service as an
information service, never singling out a telecommunications service that
may have some part in the offering of the information service.237 Since these
determinations, “Congress has never signaled disapproval of the
Commission’s current statutory interpretation or taken any action to
overturn it—a strong indicator that the Commission’s approach thus far has
been the one intended by Congress.”238
Congress’s and the FCC’s non-regulatory policies have proved to be
successful. In an argument against Internet neutrality, AT&T Corporation
explained that the
market [is] competitive . . . wireless broadband Internet access
has become a vibrant part of the marketplace and a true
competitive threat, serving as an alternative for a host of wireline
broadband applications. And beyond the mere number of
competitors,
many
other
factors
demonstrate
the
competitiveness of the marketplace. There are more applications
and content providers than ever before, some of which have
customer bases many times the size of any broadband provider’s
customer base; broadband penetration figures continue to climb;
broadband speeds are rising; and broadband prices are
dropping.239
The general consensus is that minimal Internet regulation promotes the
most competition and innovation.240 That is why Congress specifically
provided to maintain the same regulatory framework. As the FCC has
maintained for over 10 years since the Telecommunications Act was
enacted, broadband Internet access is properly classified as a whole as an
information service exempt from any regulation under Title II.241 The FCC

236. See supra note 86.
237. Letter from Seth P. Waxman, Counsel for the U. S. Telecom Ass’n., supra note 234,
at 7-8.
238. Id. at 9.
239. Comments of AT&T, Inc. to FCC, supra note 10, at 226.
240. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 509, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006); Comments of
AT&T, Inc. to FCC, supra note 10, at 226.
241. Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,540 para. 80; Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976 (2005).
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believed this interpretation was “entirely consistent, both internally and
with the letter and spirit of the Act.”242 Not only is it consistent “with the
letter and spirit of the Act,” but it is mandatory as set forth by Congress in
the Telecommunications Act.
C. Congress Did Not Intend for Facilities-Based ISPs to “Unbundle” Their
Service
The FCC’s Notice of Inquiry contemplates thrusting Computer II’s
“unbundling” requirements on the Internet connectivity component of
facilities-based ISPs, but still treats Internet access as an information
service.243 Under this scheme, the FCC would regulate only the underlying
telecommunications component that actually transports the information
the ISPs offer to their customers and would treat the Internet connectivity
component as a common carrier offering under Title II.244 Thus, only ISPs
that own their own facilities (facilities-based providers) would be subject to
regulation.245 Among other requirements, ISPs would be required to lease
their lines on a common carrier basis to competitors on the same terms and
conditions as their own offering.246
Under the Computer Inquiry proceedings, the FCC treated facilitiesbased providers differently from non-facilities-based providers.247 Pursuat
to the FCC’s regulations, enhanced service providers that owned their own
lines were required to lease those lines to competitors.248 This practice
mitigated the risk of one provider having a monopoly over all the wires
used to provide the enhanced service.249 Therefore, the FCC was able to
promote competition in a world that depended on telephone wires to
transport information.250
Even though Congress intended to incorporate the FCC’s dichotomy
between enhanced and basic services into the Telecommunications Act as
discussed above, it does not follow that every FCC policy dealing with those

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Universal Service Report, supra note 46, at 11,552 para. 105.
Notice of Inquiry, supra note 12, at para. 28.
Id.
Id. at paras. 1, 28.
47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(4) (2006).
Computer II, supra note 49, at para. 231.
See id.
See Letter to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, supra note 79, at 3-4 n.11.
See id.
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services was incorporated.251 There is no grant of authority within the Act
signaling Congress’s intent to single out any one offering and subject that
offering to Title II regulation as a common carrier. Justice Thomas argued,
In the Computer II rules, the Commission subjected facilitiesbased providers to common-carrier duties not because of the
nature of the “offering” made by those carriers, but rather
because of the concern that local telephone companies would
abuse the monopoly power . . . . The differential treatment of
facilities-based carriers was therefore a function not of the
definitions of “enhanced-service” and “basic service,” but instead
of a choice by the Commission to regulate more stringently, in its
discretion, certain entities that provided enhanced service. The
Act’s definitions, however, parallel the definitions of enhanced
and basic service, not the facilities-based grounds on which that
policy choice was based, and the Commission remains free to
impose special regulatory duties on facilities-based ISPs under its
Title I ancillary jurisdiction.252
Since the FCC promulgated these rules in the 1980s, the landscape has
changed. The threat of an enhanced service provider maintaining an unfair
monopoly has subsided. The FCC designed these outdated, unbundling
regulations for a world that was connected through one wire, not “today’s
multi-platform broadband IP environment.”253 The “unbundling” rules
prevented a single company with a monopoly from refusing other
companies access to its wires. According to the FCC, the underlying “basic
service is the building block upon which enhanced services are offered.”254
Therefore, this unbundling allowed other enhanced service providers to
offer their services using the same transmission lines. Unbundling would no
251. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 995-96
(2005).
252. Id. at 996 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
253. Letter to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, supra note 79, at 3-4 n.11.
[W]hile the Computer Inquiry rules may have served the Commission’s policy
goals in the narrowband, circuit-switched ‘one-wire world’ for which they were
initially created 40 years ago, they would be a serious impediment to broadband
investment and innovation in today’s multi-platform broadband IP
environment, which is why the Commission has categorically rejected applying
those rules to cable, wireline and wireless broadband providers.
Id.
254. Computer II, supra note 49, at para. 231.
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longer serve the same purpose because we no longer live in a one-wire
world. In fact, a person does not even need a wire to connect to the Internet,
and there are multiple broadband platforms in regular use. Thus, the
original purpose for the unbundling requirement is no longer necessary,
and this discretionary rule promulgated by the FCC during the Computer
Inquiry proceedings should not be imputed as Congress’s intent without
further evidence.
Congress could not have intended to apply the unbundling requirements
on broadband ISPs because that would defy Congress’s own policy
statements in section 230 for the same reasons stated in Part IV(B)(2)
supra.255 Congress favored de-regulation and intended to keep the Internet
and ISPs free from state and federal regulation.256 Furthermore, Congress
intended to keep the market free and competitive.257 ISPs, such as Verizon
and AT&T (among others), fear that
this antiquated regulatory structure would require all providers
to divert time and resources from deploying broadband networks
so that they can design and implement the myriad systems and
processes necessary to comply with a bevy of newly imposed
Title II obligations and requirements. At best, this would lead to
major market uncertainties that will hamper each company’s
ability to raise and deploy capital efficiently. At worst, it would
seriously undermine the value of broadband investments already
made and disincent [sic] new ones. In either case, the Title II
classification proposal would dampen broadband investment
and job-producing economic growth at the worst possible
time.258
As Justice Thomas stated, the FCC is free to impose Title I regulations on
the telecommunications component pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction,
but the authority to impose Title II common carrier regulations on the
telecommunications component is unfounded.
Before 2010, the FCC properly interpreted the Act in accordance with
Congress’s intent. The FCC’s official recognition of broadband Internet

255.
256.
257.
258.

47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
Id.
Letter to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, FCC, supra note 79, at 6.
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access as one offering under the Act is a classification that even the Supreme
Court affirmed as reasonable under Congress’s directives.259
V. CONCLUSION
In 1980, the FCC formally began a practice of de-regulation in terms of
new technologies that were classified as enhanced services. This
classification scheme was further recognized in the Modification of Final
Judgment by the District Court of the District of Columbia. Congress,
having complete knowledge of the existing de-regulatory framework
imposed by the FCC and the court, codified this structure in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. In doing so, Congress intended that
Internet access services be afforded shelter from regulation and be
considered an information service as one offering—not subject to
mandatory Title II regulation. Congress did not take any action whatsoever
to indicate it had changed the Computer II classification framework.
Instead, Congress wrote the FCC’s dichotomy into statutory law. Any effort
by the FCC to reclassify broadband Internet access services as a
telecommunications service would be adverse to the power Congress
specifically delegated to it, and therefore, a violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act. Although Congress implemented the FCC’s dichotomy,
there is no statutory authority or provision to suggest that Congress
intended the FCC to regulate the Internet connectivity component of
broadband Internet access as a telecommunications service. The FCC does
not have the authority to reclassify broadband Internet access or any
component thereof as a telecommunications service.
In a recent gathering, the FCC’s Commissioner Michael Copps declared
that “[o]ur [FCC’s] job now is to correct course by reclassifying broadband
as the telecommunications service that it is—you know, actually call an
apple an apple!”260 But to act within its congressionally delegated power, the
FCC must wait for Congress to call it an apple.

259. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 979, 977
(2005).
260. Michael J. Copps, Statement of FCC Commissioner at “The Future of the Internet”
Public Hearing, FCC 3 (2010), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/
2010/db1117/DOC-302855A1.pdf.

